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Abstract—We propose that blockchain/distributed ledger (DL)
systems be characterized by three simultaneous general require-
ments: organizational and technical decentralization; tamper-
proof recording of events and their evidence; and guaran-
teed resource (= asset) preservation. Including evidence extends
blockchain/DL systems to serving as digital twins for physi-
cal processes and resources. Resource preservation generalizes
the “no-double-spending” property to allowing dynamically ad-
justable and user-specific credit limits and having multiple, user-
definable resources.
We formulate a simple theorem that highlights that enforcing
credit limits is essentially the only problem requiring more than
point-to-point communication. In particular, without credit limit
enforcement essentially all communication between authenticated
parties in a (smart) contract can be kept completely private.
Conversely, some privacy leakage to a third party is necessary for
credit limit enforcement. This naturally gives rise to a lightweight
architecture for permissioned blockchain/DL systems where all
communication between parties is “off-chain” (= point-to-point
or in separate private channels for multi-party contracts) and
only resource transfers need to be validated by a decentralized
system employing a suitable distributed consensus protocol. We
point out that such consensus protocol need not reach agreement
on a globally total order of transactions, which is the main cause
of inefficiency in presently popular blockchain/DL systems, since
resource transfers commute with each other and thus can be
processed in any order with limited synchronization: only credit
limit enforcement requires some communication amongst the on-
chain nodes.
I. ELABORATION
In terms of the REA accounting modeling [1]–[3], a
blockchain/DL system records events such as transfers of
resources and information between agents. The difference
between resources and information is that the former must
not be duplicated, whereas the latter can be freely copied.
The system thus guarantees the invariant that the sum of
all resources owned by anybody is invariant under transfers:
transferring 50 ETH from account A to account B does not
change the total amount of ETH. The system furthermore
guarantees the no-double-spend property: the transfer is only
valid and effected if account A contains at least 50 ETH;
that is, A’s balance must be nonnegative at all times. In other
words, the no-double-spend property amounts to enforcing a
credit limit of 0 on all accounts.
It is worthwhile keeping resource preservation separate
from credit limit enforcement for two reasons. First, without
credit limit enforcement no validation and thus no consensus
amongst more than the involved parties is required.
Theorem: Assume all accounts have no credit limit. Let T
be a set of resource transfers. Then all t ∈ T are valid and
commute with each other, that is they can be performed in
arbitrary order.
In particular, if two authenticated agents agree on a contract
involving resource transfers such as a loan agreement, they
only need to have local communication: they need to agree on
the sequence of events, including transfers, that have happened
at any given point in time by sending signed messages and
acknowledging their receipt. In case of disagreement a party to
the contract can provide the cryptographically hashed sequence
of signed message exchanges to a third party as tamper-proof
evidence of the history of events. Note that tamper-proof
recording does not require validation by a third party.
Second, nonzero credit limits can be agent-specific and
context-dependent. For example, an airline may sell (transfer)
more flight tickets or a car manufacturer more cars than it
presently has in storage if it manages to produce them (just
in) time. Or one designated agent—the central bank—may
have a dynamic credit limit of digital cash, a fiat currency
managed as a cryptocurrency on a blockchain/DL system.
If all other agents have a zero credit limit this represents a
full reserve system. If designated other agents—banks—have
policy-controlled non-zero credit limits, this corresponds to a
fractional reserve system. In both cases, cryptocurrency cannot
only be issued, but also retired, for example as part of loan
repayments.
The analysis suggests a blueprint for generalized permis-
sioned blockchain/DL systems that are highly scalable: A dis-
tributed consensus network validating only resource transfers;
all other messages are point-to-point and private, employing
standard encryption and authentication technology such as
TLS. The consensus network furthermore only needs to solve
a simplified consensus problem: it need not agree on a total
order of transactions nor even on a partial order; it only needs
to ensure that the transfers its nodes validate are guaranteed or
sufficiently unlikely to eventually violate the individual agents’
credit limit requirements.
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